The analysis of plant names offers enormous interpretive possibilities in the field of lexical semantics. (On the name-related interpretation of an expression's meaning, see, for example, Carroll 1985.) One such possibility, for example, is to define a plant term through the prism of the linguistic worldview as proposed by Bartmiński (1999 Bartmiński ( , 2007 Bartmiński ( , 2009 , another -by the theory of cognitive domains as delineated by Langacker (1987 Langacker ( , 1988a Langacker ( , 1988b Langacker ( , 2005 Langacker ( , 2008 . The problem is not a trivial one: what is required of a modern lexical analysis nowadays is that it should offer an account of how, for example, the meaning of the word pansy 'any of various plants of the genera Achimenes or Viola, especially V. tricolor or its hybrids, having flowers with velvety petals of various colors' is related to such disparate meanings as 'a man or boy who is considered effeminate' or even to 'a homosexual male'.
Introduction
The analysis of plant names offers enormous interpretive possibilities in the field of lexical semantics. One such possibility, for example, is to define a plant term through Echoes of the role of language in perceiving reality can be found as early as in Aristotle's Poetics, where the generally known and widely acceptable judgments labelled topoi (loci communes) were used in the process of deduction and argumentation, underlying logical syllogisms (Aritsotle, Poetics II, (21) (22) . Other characteristic features of linguistic worldview, described as Weltansicht, draw from the 19th and 20th century German ethnolinguistic tradition (cf. Humboldt 1836; Weisgerber 1929; Gipper 1972 -see Anusiewicz 1990 ). One should also stress the importance of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. This hypothesis, which is a part of anthropological linguistics, holds that the nature of a given language influences the habitual thought of its speakers, and that different patterns of language yield different patterns of thought.
3 Finally, contemporary research upon linguistic worldview, in the form carried out by the Ethnolinguistic School of Lublin, owes a great deal to the work of Anna Wierzbicka 4 and the Moscow Semantic School, where the concepts of "the world model" and "naïve world model" are still being developed on the grounds of Russian ethnolinguistics. 5 what extent is a matter for discussion) the perception and understanding of the social situation by a member of the community" (Bartmiński 2009: 23) . 3 Whorf makes the following observation:
"We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds -and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way -an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language" (Whorf and Carrol 1964: 212-214) . 4 The research based on the Natural Semantic Metalanguage carried out by Wierzbicka provides interesting observations of the relationship between the language, culture and history of the language communities examined (cf. Wierzbicka 1985 Wierzbicka , 1992 Wierzbicka , 1996 Wierzbicka , 1997 Wierzbicka , 1999 . Similar comparative linguistic research is carried out by other Polish linguists, inter alia Puzynina (1989 Puzynina ( , 1992 Puzynina ( , 1997 Puzynina ( , 1998 , Grzegorczykowa (1990 Grzegorczykowa ( , 2001 Grzegorczykowa ( , 2004 , Waszakowa Waszakowa 2000-2003) . 5 It is worth reflecting upon the following observation made by Apresyan (1974: 57-59 ):
"The naive picture of the world, which is slowly formed throughout centuries, and which includes a naive geometry, a naive physics, a naive psychology and so on, reflects the material and spiritual experience of a people and can therefore be specific for people in two respects. First, the naive picture of a certain domain of reality can differ strikingly from the purely logical, scientific picture of that domain, which is common to people speaking very different languages. [...] The task of a lexicographer, if he does not want to abandon his own discipline and turn into an encyclopaedist, consists in revealing the naive picture of the world hidden in the lexical meanings of words and reflecting it in a system of explications. [...] Second, the naive pictures of the world, which can be extracted by semantic analysis from meanings of words in different languages, can differ in various details from one another, whereas the scientific picture of the world does not depend on the language in which it is described." See also Apresyan (1994 Apresyan ( , 1995 , Ivanov and Toporov (1985) , Tolstoy (1990 Tolstoy ( , 1995 Tolstoy ( , 1997 , Tolstaya (1993 Tolstaya ( , 2004 Tolstaya ( , 2006 , Arutyunova (1994 Arutyunova ( , 1999 , and others (cf. Bartmiński 2007: 12) .
Although nowadays the notion of "linguistic worldview" is understood in many ways, no particular version has been "officially" selected as binding, as various linguists seem to stress different aspects of the term. Grzegorczykowa (1990: 43) , for instance, stresses a "conceptual structure fossilised in the system of a given language". Tokarski (1998: 10) , in turn, focuses on a "set of regularities in grammatical and lexical structures, manifesting various ways of perceiving the world". According to Maćkiewicz (1999: 52, translation mine) , linguistic worldview interprets the "reality a human being encounters, and regulates human behaviour towards this reality". Muszyń-ski and Korżyk seem to go one step further stressing the so-called "ad-linguistic" data, such as socially entrenched, belief-based knowledge of the world, common to the speaker (sender) and the hearer (receiver), without which both the process of communication and the interpretation of an utterance would not be possible (Muszyński 1988; Korżyk 1999; also Bartmiński 2009: 34 ). Bartmiński's definition stresses the epistemological (interpretive) nature of linguistic worldview (perceived as a "set of judgments"), which "is not limited to what is 'fossilized' or closed as a 'structure' [but] makes room for the dynamic, open nature of the worldview, and does not favour abstract 'regularity' in grammar and vocabulary" (Bartmiński 2009: 24) .
Among the various approaches to the notion of linguistic world view, it is Bartmiński's version that prevails in the so-called contemporary ethnolinguistic discourse.
6
On the one hand, a wealth of data, a painstaking analysis of conversations and interviews with rural speakers, narratives, stories, proverbs, songs, fairy tales, or folk poetry (cf. Zinken 2004a (cf. Zinken , 2009 ), place Bartmiński's theory firmly in the ethnolinguistic paradigm; on the other hand, many specific theoretical proposals, such as the so-called cognitive definition, place Bartmiński's linguistic world view in the cognitive linguistics paradigm (cf. Kardela 1990; Tabakowska 2004a) . Indeed, as noted by (Zinken 2009: 1-5) , the striking similarities between the proposals of the Lublin Ethnolinguistics School and the Anglo-American cognitive linguistics can hardly be overlooked.
What Bartmiński and cognitive linguistics models share is the holistic approach to meaning, i.e. an "attempt to characterise [this] meaning against a broader experiential background" (Bartmiński 2009: 3) . Although the emphasis on lexical semantics and conceptualisation is expressed in a different way (Bartmiński mainly explores the dialectological, folkloristic and ethnographic parameters of a word's meaning), it does not belittle the achievements of the Ethnolinguistic School of Lublin within the cognitive paradigm. 6 The rebirth of interest in ethnolinguistics was partially the reaction of linguists to structuralist thinking which cut language off from "its psychological, social and cultural context" (Bartmiński 2009: 6) . The somewhat different motivation to deal with ethnolinguistics in Eastern and Central Europe (especially Poland and Russia) stemmed from a response to communist ideology, its social and political aspects (cf. Tolstoy 1995; Bartmiński 1990; Zinken 2004a) . It seems that contemporary ethnolinguistics is becoming more and more popular in other countries, gaining considerable attention among Western linguistic thought (e.g. Frank et al. 2008) .
With all convergent, the though somewhat modified, aspects, Bartmiński's project of the linguistic worldview can be properly labeled as Cognitive Ethnolinguistics (Bartmiński 2009; Zinken 2004a Zinken , 2009 Nepop-Ajdaczyć 2007) . Sadly, this highly developed and thoroughly tested approach to lexical semantics, focusing on the description of real-world data, is little known in Western scientific discourse.
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The analysis and reconstruction of linguistic worldview as proposed by Bartmiński, especially the so-called cognitive definition, referred to above, will be applied now to plant names, which offer enormous interpretive possibilities in the field of lexical semantics. It seems that the attempt to define a plant term through the prism of Bartmiński's (1999 Bartmiński's ( , 2007 approach is likely to shed new light on our understanding of seemingly obvious concepts. At the same time we shall closely examine those notions used by Bartmiński that bear resmblance to the notions used in the Western cognitive linguistic tradition.
The cognitive definition
In his latest book Aspects of Cognitive Ethnolinguistics, Bartmiński describes the notion of cognitive definition 8 in the following way:
The cognitive definition aims to portray the way in which an entity is viewed by the speakers of the language, to represent socio-culturally established and linguistically entrenched knowledge, its categorisation and valuation. While recognising the need to distinguish between the linguistic and encyclopedic dictionary (i.e. not to extend a description of language onto a description of the world), this approach does not set a firm boundary between so called linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge. The boundary is "elastic": extralinguistic phenomena, such as customs and beliefs, certainly are part of meaning. Relating to Putnam's distinction between semantic markers and "stereotypical" elements in a word's intention, one could say that the role of the cognitive definition is to also capture the latter. The defined entity is a "mental object", a projection, not a reflection of the real-life artifact, although one can always compare the two to find similarities between them. (Bartmiński 2009: 67) The notion of cognitive definition is best understood when it is juxtaposed with the taxonomic definition. For instance, rosemary, as defined by an ordinary dictionary, is 'Rosmarinus officinalis, an evergreen shrub of the Labiatae family, native to the south of Europe, the leaves of which have an agreeable fragrance, and have been much used in perfumery and to some extent in medicine'. 9 It can be easily observed that the lexicographic definition available in the dictionary displays both scientific and taxonomic features. The scientific character of the definition manifests itself in making a reference to scientific rather than everyday aspects, whereas the taxonomic character of the definition consists in identifying the denotatum by virtue of tools used in logical classification that allow the establishment of a superordinate level (in this case, the reference to the Labiatae family). Though transparent and useful, a lexicographic definition, strongly based on necessary and sufficient conditions, does not exhaust the meaning potential and the encyclopedic character of a given lexical item. 10 Bartmiński's idea of replacing the lexicographic definition with a cognitive counterpart bereft of a consistently hierarchical structure and corresponding to "the interpretive perspective adequate to the competence of the speakers of a given language or of its variety" (Bartmiński 2009: 68) , leads us towards an understanding of a word's meaning which displays a profound connection between language and culture. Following Bartmiński's insights and pointing to the meaning of the word as a "culturally determined interpretation of a world" that should be "brought to the surface" in a definition (Bartmiński 2009: 68) , 11 it seems expedient to present a cognitive definition of the same rozmaryn (bot.) Rosmarinus officinalis, wiecznie zielony krzew z rodziny wargowych (Labiatae), o białych lub niebieskawych kwiatach, rosnący w krajach śródziemnomorskich; w Polsce uprawiany jako roślina ozdobna w doniczkach; liście używane jako aromatyczna przyprawa do potraw; olejek rozmarynowy stosuje się w lecznictwie i przemyśle perfumeryjnym (Słownik ję-zyka polskiego) 10 Bartmiński (2009: 68) makes the following observation:
"The scientific nature of the definitions diminishes their descriptive value, especially in the case of older, highly polysemous vocabulary, characterised by rich derivation and phraseology. Although useful in many respects, they do not help one interpret the way lexical units function in language and texts. They do not explain the semantic motivation of the derivatives. Therefore, I propose to include in the definition also the words' connotations". Also Apresyan (1974 : 67, after Wierzbicka 1985 strongly advocates the need to include "semantic association, or connotations, i.e. those pragmatic features which reflect cultural notions or traditions, habitual ways of using a given kind of thing and many other extralinguistic factors". 11 Bartmiński's speculations on language coincide with the observations made by Western cognitive linguists. Langacker, for instance, describes the meaning of word as a cognitive structure entrenched in knowledge patterns and the experience of of a given language community. The meaning is therefore immediately identified with the conceptualisation: words have no bounaries as they are inextricably bound in the whole system of knowledge, independent of language and unrestricted (Langacker 1995: 18-19; also Piekarczyk 2004: 16) . Similar observations are made by Tabakowska (1995: 20, translation mine) , who claims that "language is a direct reflection of cognitive processes which occur in the human mind and are inherent elements of human cognition". -The inclusion of folk knowledge in the definitions (so-called content adequacy): the descriptive metalanguage must be the colloquial variant, without elevated, bookish or scientific expressions.
-The requirement of structural adequacy by which a cognitive definition reconstructs the relationships between the components present in the collective consciousness of speakers. This means that it rejects the limitations imposed on the definiens (i.e. all necessary and sufficient features used for the identification of the denotatum) in favour of all positive features established in the linguistic worldview.
-The definition should be exhaustive -therefore it is rather long and its internal organisation is of prime importance.
14 -A cognitive definition resembles a single-level organisation, where obligatory components are those pertaining to the object's function, 15 origin, material makeup, quality, etc. (see the cognitive definition of rosemary above). It is not important to include the categorizing factor, as in the case of the taxonomic definition; thus, the definition has a wider application, extending onto the so-called indefinibilia.
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-The cognitive definition must take into account a detailed relationship between the connotative components of a given concept, which manifests itself in the conjunction (or co-occurrence) of features (e.g. rosemary has white flowers and it smells nice), as well as in the cause-and-effect manner (e.g. rosemary is dear to a girl -it is tended by young girls until their wedding day -its sprig is pinned to the clothes of wedding guests).
-Apart from the multitude of features that are selectively attributed to the object, Bartmiński's definition also includes stereotypical features (cf. Lippmann 1986; Putnam 1975; Lewicki 1976; Pisarek 1975; Pisarkowa 1976 Wierzbicka (1985) and the notion of fragmentary definition proposed by Pawłowski (1978) . 15 It has to be stated that the word "object" is used by Bartmiński interchangeably with the notion "concept". Consider the following observation made by Zinken (2009: 2) : "The cognitive definition [...] is intended to be a definition of the concept as it could be given by the envisaged idealised subject." 16 Wierzbicka's (1994) notion is introduced by Bartmiński (2009:72) to emphasize the importance of functional and patronomic concepts in everyday language which "categorise reality in a particular manner, without complicating the vertical structure or building abstract hierarchical arrangements".
Even though folk definitions of such concepts as rosemary contain superordinate taxonomic levels (in the case discussed, herb), it is equally common to define them via patronomic and functional definitions, as it happens in Bartmiński's cognitive definition. 17 Stereotypes play an important role in Bartmiński's research, especially in the reconstruction of the cognitive definition, where their semantic understanding should be of vital concern. An important remark here may be Putnam's observation which allows to incorporate stereotypes in the description of word meaning:
My proposal is that the normal form description of the meaning of a word should be finite sentence, or "vector", whose components should certainly include the following: [...] (i) the syntactic markers to apply to the word, e.g. "noun", (ii) the semantic markers that apply to the word, -The defining sentences of a cognitive definition are based upon a categorical, facetbased arrangement.
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The cognitive definition should also be considered in the context of other vital notions such as the point of view (viewpoint), perspective, profiling, or finally facet. Their important role will be accounted for by way of the example of another plant term -bławatek 'cornflower/bluebottle'. According to Bartmiński (2007 Bartmiński ( , 1999 , bławatek is conceptualised not only as a "plant" but it might successfully be perceived as a "flower", "weed", or even "medicinal herb". Such disparate conceptualization of the same denotatum is the result of the assumed point of view, perspective, and profiling -all responsible for the connotation of the so-called "initial categories" and determining a bunch of characteristic traits typical for these categories, which are arranged in facets, further categories that allow the organization of defining phrases (Bartmiński 2007: 50) . Bartmiński claims that a point of view which has a decisive influence upon the shape of an intitial category -usually upon a hyperonym responsible for further linguistic categorization within an established explication of the word -should be understood as a "subjective-cultural factor governing the way of talking about an object, e.g. governing the object's categorisation, the choice of an onomasiological basis for creating its name and the selection of features attributed to the object in specific utterances and entrenched in meaning" (Bartmiński 2009: 77) . A perspective is understood as "a set of properties of the semantic structure of words, correlated with and, at least to a certain extent, resulting from a point of view" (Bartmiński 2009: 78). The identification of these properties enables the receiver of an utterance to recognise the point of view assumed by the speaker. Profiling, in turn, is a vital "subjective linguistic-conceptual operation, consisting in a specific configuration of the object's image in terms of particular aspects (sub-categories, facets), such as, e.g., origin, traits, appearance, functions, events, experiences, etc., within a certain type of knowledge and in keeping with a specific point of view" (Bartmiński and Niebrzegowska 1998: 212-213 , translation by Zinken). Bartmiński (2009: 3) compares profiling to a "tamed holism" which he describes in the following way:
e.g. "animal", "period of time", (iii) a description of the additional features of the stereotype, if any, (iv) a description of the extension. (Putnam 1975: 269 ).
An interesting remark is also made by Muszyński (1982: 24) :
[A]n important aspect of Putnam's analysis is that the stereotype is understood as a theory of an object [...] . As a result, no significant differences are postulated between scientific concepts and those connected with stereotypes based on folk knowledge. Both play the same role in relation to different conceptions of the world, depending on the views of the subject, i.e. a speaker of the language in which these concepts operate. The basic task of these theories is to explain, describe, and order entities and phenomena with which humans have to do. 18 The origin of the notion "facet" is arguable here. Both Bartmiński and other researchers who deal extensively with lexical semantics associate the term with Wierzbicka (cf. Bartmiński 2009; NowakowskaKempna 1991) . However, Wierzbicka herself has never officially used this notion to name sub-categories in her own definitions (A. Głaz, personal communication ). The notion of facet is discussed further in this paper.
The concept of profiling aids in a description that reconstructs not just the linguistically entrenched stereotypical judgments about an object, but also their order when the object is seen from a particular perspective, understood as a metaphor for the social situatedness of the subject.
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Let us now analyze two instances of the plant term bławatek and its general explication as adopted by Bartmiński (2007: 82-83 It seems reasonable at this point to elaborate on the notion of the so-called facet. Facets, also labelled as aspects, "bundles of judgments", categories, or subcategories (Bartmiński 2007; also Wierzbicka 1985) remain one of the most fundamental, yet somewhat vague notions needed to reconstruct a cognitive definition of the word in the sense of Bartmiński. 20 Generally speaking, facets are qualified as the aspects of a given concept which contain defining phrases dependent on the adopted viewpoint and profiling, and 19 It has to be noted that the notion of profiling is widely used in the literature of semantics, on the grounds of American cognitivism (cf. Langacker 1991a Langacker , 2000 , and in the research proposed by e.g. Wierzbicka (1985 and subsequent publications) . It seems that Bartmiński et al. prefer the latter understanding, as it corresponds with the anthropological model, thoroughly tested on data from both folk and standard varieties of language. Simultaneously, Bartmiński (2009: 88) points out certain similarities which may contribute to the same research area:
The similarities are based on the analysis of meaning of certain language expressions within a wider context, which for Wierzbicka is the Fillmorian notion of "prototypical situation" (Wierzbicka 1985) and for Langacker is the notion of a "cognitive domain", corresponding to something that others call a "frame" or an "idealised cognitive model"" (Langacker 2000: 4-7) . The difference between Batrmiński's attitude towards conceptualizing objects and Langacker's proposal will be further discussed in subsequent parts of this paper. 20 It seems necessary to draw a special attention to the following statement made by Bartmiński (2007: 100-101 ):
Facets (sub-categories, aspects) play a leading role in our conceptual system. All three notions, frequently used interchangeably, indicate more or less the same (emphasis mine -AMH). It would be advisory to use one notion, e.g. a facet as proposed by Wierzbicka. Langacker and his followers use in this sense (emphasis mine -AMH) the notion of domain".
As will be pointed out later in this study, the understanding of Bartmiński's facet (a term adopted after Wierzbicka) does not coincide with that of domain as proposed by Langacker. whose arrangement constitutes the so-called "cognitive structure of meaning" as understood by Wierzbicka (1985) . Both the choice of facets and their order within a given explication differ for different types of dictionary entries (Bartmiński 2007: 50) . 21 The problem of naming facets is also vital. The first idea proposed by Bartmiński et al. (Bartmiński 1980: 21) was to adopt Aristotlelian ontological categories. In a contemporary version naming facets arises from an "observation of how an average mortal relates to the surrounding world" (Jodłowski 2003: 12) . Bartmiński himself claims that a "good categorization" (understood here as facet arrangement -AMH) should be "the most banal [...], maximally approaching the experiences, feelings and intuitions of the so called 'simple people'" (Bartmiński : 21, 2009 .
We can now ask whether such meanings of plant terms as Polish fiołek 'violet' connoting 'the tip of a fox's tail', banan 'banana' standing for 'a type of vehicle', or English pansy understood as 'effeminate boy or man', or even 'effeminate homosexual' get equal status as initial categories within a cognitive definition, and, what follows, receive appropriate facets on the same basis as they were established for the previously discussed bławatek 'cornflower'? The answer is not simple. If we assume, after Bartmiński, that "a point of view is a decisive factor which has a tremendous influence upon the preliminary categorisation of a given object and shapes the perspective in which the object is presented in the linguistic picture of the world" (Bartmiński 2007 : 83, translation mine), such variants as fiołek 'violet/fox's tail', banan 'banana/vehicle', or pansy/ 'effeminate homosexual' seem to fulfil this condition. On the other hand, Bartmiński (2007: 82) appears to exclude polysemy from the scope of interests upon the linguistic picture of the world, which finally results in the omission of these meanings in a postulated cognitive definition. 22 Thus, we receive a cognitive definition of the word which seems to diverge from its lexicographic counterpart and simultaneously does not allow for any "bizzare" meanings in the explication. Such an attitude makes a cognitive definition in the sense of Bartmiński more structural and less flexible and encyclopaedic in character.
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21 Wierzbicka (1985) emphasizes that the order of facets is not optional and results from the "internal logic of a given meaning". See also (Bartmiński 2007: 86) . 22 Bartmiński (2009: 87) states:
I am not interested here in polysemy, in which case systematic differences in a lexeme's meaning (but above all in its denotation) motivate those in categorisation: kamień 'stone', 'figure in a game' or 'unit of weight', kania 'kite'(bird) or 'parasol mushroom', kret 'mole' or 'mole plough', etc. Rather, I am focusing on names with the same denotation but different connotations, depending on different viewpoints and different categorisations, adjusted to the viewpoints.
A more flexible dynamic on-line model of conceptualization is proposed by Langacker with his notion of the domain matrix (to be discussed later on in this paper). 23 Establishing a cognitive definition, Bartmiński seems to derive from Wierzbicka's (1996) viewpoint. Although Wierzbicka incorporates so much "encyclopaedic" knowledge into her definitions, she still emphasizes the need for a strict division between the so-called linguistic-semantic knowledge and encyclopaedic knowledge claiming that the knowledge about some things we associate with a particular denotate are not Bartmiński's idea of the cognitive definition is an important element of the analysis which aims at reconstructing linguistic worldview. With the wealth of notions underlying the cognitive definition, such as profiling, point of view, perspective, or facets (aspects), the cognitive definition makes it possible to "reconstruct the linguistically entrenched interpretation of the world by a subject in terms that are meaningful for that subject" (cf. Bartmiński 2009; also Zinken 2009: 2) .
The question whether we are talking about a dynamic approach to the concept which allows establishment of an open set of characteristics bereft of any boundaries imposed on a definition is still dubious here. Obviously, one should not minimize the role of linguistic worldview as proposed by Bartmiński et al. and the impact this notion has on contemporary linguistics. Detailed studies of language reconstructed from various language communities as well as the wealth of recalled linguistic contexts undoubtedly place the linguistic worldview within the limits of cognitive linguistics. Still, together with its static and structure-oriented viewpoint (e.g. facet arrangement) and the manifestation of a clear-cut boundary between linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge, Bartmiński's concept does not cross certain boundaries as far as his approach to definitions and defining is concerned. Whether such a possibility exists at all will be thoroughly discussed in the subsequent part of this paper.
Langacker and his approach to linguistic semantics -the domain matrix
Having discussed Bartmiński's approach to word meaning, it is time to elaborate on Langacker's attitude to it. In his numerous works, Langacker stresses the necessity to activate encyclopedic knowledge, if we are to understand a given concept properly. According to Langacker, treating the concept of word meanings as "small discrete chunks of conceptual structure" (Croft and Cruse 2004: 30) should be discarded in favour of an approach which allows us to view the meaning of a word as an access node into the knowledge network (Langacker 1987: 163): The entity designated by a symbolic unit can therefore be thought of as a point of access to a network. The semantic value of a symbolic unit is given by the open-ended set of relations [...] in which this access node participates. Each of these relations is a cognitive routine, and because they share at least one component, the activation of one routine facilitates (but does not always necessitate) the activation of another.
The encyclopaedic and dynamic character of concepts as understood by Langacker echoes in the nature of linguistic meaning which should be characterised against five basic claims (Langacker 1988b: 49-50): part of the linguistic meaning of the word (see, for instance, Wierzbicka's definition of mouse). Such an attitude towards a strict distinction between linguistic and encyclopaedic knowledge is connected with a number of theoretical commitments that underlie her approach (Taylor 2002 ).
-meaning reduces to conceptualization (mental experience); -a frequently-used expression typically displays a network of interrelated senses; -semantic structures are characterized relative to "cognitive domains" (emphasis mine); -a semantic structure derives its value through the imposition of a "profile" (designatum) on a "base"; -semantic structures incorporate conventional "imagery", i.e. they construe a situation in a particular fashion.
Special attention should be drawn to cognitive domains. Langacker analyzes a semantic unit (taking into account a concept of the word rather than the word itself) using the notion of domain, i.e. any knowledge configuration which provides the context for the conceptualization of this unit (Taylor 2002: 439) . Since the majority of concepts require more than one domain for their full characterization, such a set of relevant domains constitutes the domain matrix against which a concept is characterized (Langacker 1987; also Taylor 2002: 439) . Langacker views the domain matrix as an essentially open-ended knowledge base where a new usage of a semantic unit can be easily accommodated. In this respect, accessing an expression's meaning via cognitive domains is more encyclopaedic than doing so via a dictionary entry or a cognitive definition proposed by Bartmiński. 24 The difference between the dictionary view of linguistic semantics and its encyclopaedic counterpart in the sense of Langacker is shown in Figure 1 .
As Langacker puts it, a dictionary entry gives limited knowledge of a semantic unit confined to a few semantic features or descriptive statements that are clearly set apart from general knowledge concerning the type of entity referred to. Conversely, the approach of lexical semantics emphasizes the fact that a lexical meaning lies in a particular way of accessing an open-ended body of knowledge related to a certain type of en-dictionary semantics encyclopaedic semantics Figure 1 . Dictionary vs. encyclopedic semantics. From Langacker (2008: 39) .
tity (Langacker 2008: 38-39 Most concepts require specifications in more than one domain for their characterization. The concept [BANANA] , for example, includes in its matrix a specification for shape in the spatial (and/or visual) domain; a color configuration involving the coordination of colour space with this domain; a location in the domain of taste/smell sensations; as well as numerous specifications pertaining to abstract domains, e.g. the knowledge that bananas are eaten, that they grow in bunches on trees, that they come from tropical areas and so on. (Langacker 1987: 154) Obviously, the knowledge of the concept [BANANA] as discussed by Langacker is not confined to the explication given above. Apart from certain domains that are virtually always activated whenever the expression is used (e.g. the domain of colour or shape), there are also those activated less frequently (e.g. the domain indicating the origin), or even ones so peripheral that we refer to them only in special circumstances. Therefore, the concept [BANANA] may also be recalled while talking about:
-an inflated swimming device in the shape of banana drawn by a motorboat (source: Focus 8/2000); -a small country that is economically dependent on a single export commodity, such as bananas, and is typically governed by a dictator or the armed forces (source: Petras, J., Z magazine, April 2000); -a truncheon (source: Słownik tajemnych gwar przestępczych 1993: 29); -a nail file (source: www.sallybeauty.com); -a type of banana-shaped plug (source: www.muellerelectric.com); -a banana-shaped bag (source: www.my-wardrobe.com); -a broad smile (source: www.filmweb.pl).
as well as lots of other uses which emphasize different domains against which the concept is understood, such as the information that people can slip on banana skins, or, in most extreme cases, that our sister put sliced bananas on her cereal for breakfast this morning (Langacker 1987: 159; also Taylor 2002: 442) . 25 However various the domains may be, it has to be noted that they overlap with one another within a complex matrix, often to the extent of full inclusion (Langacker 2008: 47) . Therefore, the shape of [BANANA] activated in the spatial domain is recalled not only while describing a fruit but also in such distant meanings of the concept as, e.g. a swimming device, or a truncheon. The situation is presented in Figure 2 . (Langacker 2008: 48.) Obviously, one can raise an objection against an encyclopaedic approach as understood by Langacker and his notion of the domain matrix, claiming that not everything we know about a given concept has equal status and is both linguistically and semantically relevant.
26 Without doubt, a bamboo is first and foremost perceived as a tall tropical plant with hollow stems that is used for making furniture and, as such, is activated more frequently than a bamboo standing for an Afroamerican, a head, or a silly person. Should we therefore exclude the domains activated by the last three words from the domain matrix of the concept [BAMBOO] , treating them as highly peripheral? If not, is there any possibility to assign them the role of central domains on a par with the one indicating typical and commonly shared characteristics of [BAMBOO]? It seems that there is no unambiguous answer, which does not mean that there is no feasible solution to the problem at all. What diffrentiates Langacker's theory from other attitudes towards lexical semantics presented in this chapter is the idea of an open-ended encyclopaedic description of a word which manifests itself in a dynamic character of the domain matrix."Language is learned and used in context", says Langacker (1987: 155) , emphasizing that we can talk about any facet of our conceptual universe and that a given expression allows us to make indefinitely many interpretations depending on the conceived situation to which it is applied. That is why centrality, understood by Langacker (2008: 48) as "the likelihood of a particular domain being activated when an expression is used on a given occasion", allows us to accept such cases as daisy 'one that is deemed excellent or notable', pansy 'an effeminate homosexual', rose 'a compass card or its representation', ziemniak-przeszkoda 'potato-an obstacle' or kasztan włamywacz 'chestnut-a burglar' both in central and peripheral domains, whose status changes dynamically, depending on the activated context in which a given word is used. 27 Langacker also says (2008: 48), "certain domains are so central that we can hardly use the expression without evoking them, some are activated less consistently, and others are so peripheral that we invoke them only in special circumstances, when they happen to be relevant". These degrees of centrality are presented in Figure 3 . (Langacker 2008: 48.) Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the dynamic character of domains whose centrality is context-dependent does not entitle us to establish only a general pattern where particular domains are always central whereas others always peripheral. According to the 27 Langacker (1988b: 57-58) elaborates on the notion of centrality in the following way:
I posit no specific boundary between our linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge of the entity designated by a term [...] . Far more realistic, I believe, is to posit a gradation of "centrality" in the specifications constituting our encyclopedic knowledge of an entity: some domains and specifications are obviously more salient and linguistically more important than others, and in practise we will focus our attention primarily on these, but the imposition of any precise or rigid boundary is considered arbitrary. A number of factors contribute to a specification's degree of centrality, among them whether the specified property is inherent or contingent, whether it is generic or specific, whether it is peculiar to the entity in question or shared by many others, and so on [...] . At the level of cognitive processing, centrality can be explicated as the likelihood that a particular specification will be activated on a given occasion when a term is used. dynamic, on-line account of meaning which is "never totally fixed or invariable" (Langacker 2008: 49) , even the most peripheral domain can get central status depending on the type of context established.
Obviously, Ronald Langacker's idea to defining concepts via cognitive domains cannot be treated on a par with sample definitions proposed by Bartmiński. Nevertheless, the notion of the domain matrix, although dealt with on the conceptual and cognitive level, points to the importance of an encyclopedic character and, as such, may contribute to a deeper understanding of a word's meaning.
Conclusions
The discussion of the two approaches to the semantic analysis of plant terms points to the pivotal role of context in determining word meaning. That the study of meaning is central to the linguistic enterprise is hardly surprising. As pointed out by Jackendoff (2002: 267, after Evans 2009: 3), meaning is the "holy grail' not only of linguistics, but also of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience... Understanding how we mean and how we think is a vital issue for our intuitive sense of ourselves as human beings. For most people, meaning is intuitively the central issue of the study of language -far more important than understanding details of word order or morphology.
The two approaches discussed in this chapter crucially exploit, to use Chomsky's parlance, "extralinguistic knowledge" in defining word meaning although they do it using different tools. Thus, Bartmiński relies heavily on empirical findings which allow him to reconstruct socio-cultural situatedness. 28 This manifests in the way Batrmiński's definition is structured. Bartmiński proposes the cognitive definition which represents "socio-culturally established and linguistically entrenched knowledge, its categorisation and valuation" (Bartmiński 2009: 67) , as has been thoroughly discussed with the example of rosemary. Langacker, in turn, stresses the importance of accessing the meaning via more theoretical constructs, namely domains.
Another feature that is shared by the two approaches is attitude towards the distinction between linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge. The issue that allows for the juxtaposition of a typical cognitive semantic approach with a more classical lexical field approach is reflected in both the approaches proposed, although a certain evolution towards the conception of meaning explicitly encyclopedic in nature is favoured. 29 As observed by Fillmore and Atkins (1992: 76-77, after Geeraerts 2010: 222-223) , A major activity for lexical semanticists influenced by the field notion is that of cataloguing the kind of inter-item relations that can be defined for the elements of the lexicon, and characterising the kinds of lexical sets that are structured in terms of such relationships. Semantic theories founded on a notion of cognitive frames or knowledge schemata, by contrast, approach the description of lexical meaning in a quite different way. In such theories, the word's meaning can be understood only with reference to a structured background of experience, beliefs, or practices, constituting a kind of conceptual prerequisite for understanding the meaning. Speakers can be said to know the meaning of the word only by first understanding the background frames that motivated the concept that the word encodes. Within such an approach, words and word senses are not related to each other directly, word to word, but only by way of the links to common background frames and indications of the manner in which their meanings highlight particular elements of such frames.
It appears that it is Ronald Langacker who proposes the most flexible alternative towards the meaning in which the main focus is laid upon its dynamic character. In this sense, Langacker goes one step further in arguing for the dynamicity and on-line character of meaning. In contrast to Bartmiński's theory, which concentrates on what we already know about the language on the basis of available material (i.e. texts, myths, oral tradition, rituals, etc.), Langacker's theory stresses the importance of context relative to which meanings of lexical items are defined. For the same reason, Langacker's domains and the domain matrix have a more dynamic character than structural and static facets proposed by Bartmiński. Ronald Langacker's open-ended, domain-based approach to defining and definitions can, it seems, offer a great deal more to the lexicographer than the facet-based approach to word meanings. This, as we shall see, is certainly true in the case of plant terms which involve semantic extensions. These, as Langacker (1987: 157) puts it, "[are] such a pervasive and central linguistic phenomenon that one can legitimately question the wisdom of an approach to semantics that fails to account for [them] in a unified way".
